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How Moscow rationalises its military role

maments planning presupposes a ategic concept. The Soviet 's objective is world revolution, med force as the crucial factor in plementation.

as a past master at psycho-strate- Kremlin has dialectically reinter- the role of the military. Com- t leaders claim their armed forces ly to be deployed in a defensive

iet military policy is thus aimed at g out a strategic defensive, by the pundit understands a wide- g defence with operational meas- including attack.

is up to the defender to decide n offensive may be necessary and to launch it.

his formula can be put to good psy- ogical use, even in dealing with the radiction that the distended Russian nce machine has grown out of all portion to the alleged danger the et military propose to counter by ans of the strategic defensive.

a world power is not only threa- at its borders; it also has a military and political zones to defend.

keeping with this strategy the Union has built up a navy superi-

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o the US Navy in the number of s it has in service.

he Red Army's land-based forces stantially exceed those of the West in ber, while the Soviet air force flies d-generation fighters and bombers.

oviet depth of penetration is signifi- , manoeuvrability substantial. What more, the Soviet Union has missile s with a firepower that has become a ger to the free world.

he Russians have many more theatre lear weapons than Nato. In medium- ge missiles they outnumber Nato to one. Moscow is currently spend- three times as much as Washington strategic arms.

So in two years' time at the latest iet missile units will be in a position eliminate all land-based US launching s for strategic missiles.

The entire deterrent strategy of the ited States in thus in jeopardy, and this is a prospect on which the Reagan administration plans to take action.

America's readiness to invest more than $100bn more in missile modernisation in the years ahead is consequently more than mere romantic war pathos on President Reagan's part.

The United States has to do something militarily unless it is to run the risk of being blackmailed politically. Defence Secretary Weinberger describes the new US strategy as follows:

"We are now working on putting together a deterrent capacity that will show the Soviet Union that an attack would cost it intolerable losses."

Mass production of the neutron device is but part of the programme. Mr Weinberger has left no doubt that arms modernisation will cost time and not just money.

How has a situation arisen in which the United States can for the time being do no more than react? Salt 2 is one of the reasons why.

In 1979 President Carter agreed to the Soviet Union building more strategic launching pads than the United States. He allowed the other side a virtual monopoly, especialy in the megaton strategic systems sector.

Salt 2 was when the strategic imbalance was to all intents and purposes prepared in advance.

There is an imbalance in conventional arms too. The Soviet Union could do more than reinforce in next to no time a possible European front with dozens of divisions.

It also has the potential, both airborne and land-based, to send fully-equipped units into the oil-producing Middle East.



Genscher in Athens

Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left) with Greek Prime Minister George Rallis during an official two-day visit to Athens. (Photo: dpa)

The United States does not; its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is an army on paper only. Besides, the Pentagon has no clear idea of what the RDF's role is to be.

No-one is sure what shape the command structure is to take, and what is even more basic, the US military establishment does not have the manpower needed for an RDF.

Unless conscription is reintroduced the entire idea is mere wishful thinking. As for the units that have already been earmarked, they lack the weapons needed for special missions.

Tactical arrangement of the US divisions is designed to suit a European theatre, and these shortcomings can not even be offset by units being equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.

For one it is unlikely these weapon systems could even be meaningfully deployed. What is more, the Soviet divisions as their putative adversary are more generously equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.

So as yet there is no such thing as an RDF as a strategic instrument for bringing about a political decision.

A rejig of the US Navy is also called for, with more than 20,000 specialists not available, and there will be even more once the current naval shipbuilding programme gets under way.

The only way to fill these vacant posts is to reintroduce conscription, so the men in charge of America's strategic comeback must not just concern themselves with technical details.

America must present its allies with a credible strategic concept that holds forth promise of future validity.

Adelbert Weinstein

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 August 1981)

Deciding on the bank to pay the piper

It was no coincidence that major policy statements by US President Reagan and Bonn Foreign Minister Genscher came in such swift succession.

While Mr Reagan talked openly of the superiority the United States hoped to regain in the world Herr Genscher, the FDP leader, called for European integration.

Europe, he said, had to develop the capability of political action, especially on security matters.

Herr Genscher's appeal came hard on the heels of President Reagan's decision to go ahead and develop the neutron bomb, a decision that hurt Western Europe by the way in which it was made public.

Bonn in particular has every reason to feel alarmed. The Federal Republic of Germany already has a heavy density of conventional and nuclear armament.

So the deployment of new weapons in Germany would, as Washington well knows, be an additional military risk.

The neutron bomb is intended for use in central Europe, and Germans are growing increasingly worried about being degraded to US tactical theatre status.

For Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher President Reagan's neutron bomb decision could hardly have come at a more awkward time.

It makes it more difficult for them to advocate credibly the twofold Nato Resolution to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles but first to hold disarmament talks with the Soviet Union.

Their position is made even more difficult by Mr Reagan not ruling out disarmament talks with the Kremlin but taking more time to prepare for them than Bonn had expected.

In Germany a growing number of ideologically-motivated politicians who are unmoved by factual considerations are calling for disarmament talks here and now.

Anti-American sentiment is on the increase among both Herr Schmidt's Social Democrats and Herr Genscher's Free Democrats.

Even SPD Premier Johannes Rau of North Rhine-Westphalia, who is on good terms with the Chancellor, has called for critical detachment from the United States.

Herr Schmidt will have difficulty in salvaging the Nato decision that is reputed to have been his brainchild at the Munich SPD party conference next spring.

Herr Genscher too can expect to face increasing dissatisfaction from the ranks of his FDP. Both politicians have staked their political reputations on the Nato arms modernisation decision.

The Reagan administration is aware of these specifically European difficulties but is not losing much sleep over them.

Richard Allen, President Reagan's security adviser, has calmly announced that Western Europe is suffering from a distorted interpretation of detente that has sired a patently pacifist approach.

The United States, on the other hand, has long parted company with the de-

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■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Help out for a change, East Bloc urged

East Bloc and Opec countries have been called on to step up their efforts to help the developing world.

The appeal was made at the United Nations conference on new and renewable energy resources in Nairobi.

The industrialised West was not committed to pay more to developing countries.

The conference steered clear of setting up an expensive new UN special organisation, and at America's behest private enterprise was even assigned a special role in the Third World's energy efforts.

The European Community countries, which initially seemed to be ploughing a slightly different furrow, eventually reverted to the US line.

The unanimously approved Nairobi action programme on the development and exploitation of new and renewable energy resources calls for the mobilisation of "additional and appropriate" financial means.

But there is no mention of these extra funds having to be in addition to aid already given or pledged. Transferring aid from less urgent projects to energy projects would thus qualify as extra.

What is more, public and private funds are to be deployed, raised by all developed countries, including the East Bloc, and developing countries able to raise the cash, in other words the Opec states.

So it is no longer merely the industrialised countries of the West that are saddled with a responsibility by the developing world.

The second major clash, after the finances were settled, was the dispute over institutions.

At various stages the developing countries had called for the establishment of a new UN agency, of a new committee, of a Third World Bank to be underwritten by the industrialised countries and a new UN special organisation.

The West had rejected all these proposals, except that the European Community, unlike the United States, had said it would be prepared to accept a World Bank subsidiary dealing solely with the energy issues that were the conference's brief.

But the Americans were adamant. In the end an interim committee consisting of all interested UN member-countries was to be set up.

It is only to meet once, however, for a two-week session next year. It will draft a report to be submitted to the 1982 UN General Assembly.

So an international committee is to deal with new and renewable energy resources and, as an experienced German diplomat has pointed out, interim committees can go on virtually for ever at the United Nations.

But the committee is not to be given a secretariat or other organisational facilities of its own.

The Nairobi conference was attended by delegations from 123 countries, officially 125 if one accepts the UN fiction that the Ukraine and Byelorussia are separate countries and not just two extra votes for the Soviet Union.

Ten special organisation and 25 UN programmes and other bodies were represented, as were 27 other international institutions and organisations and four political parties.

These were the South-West African People's Association (Swapo), the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African Congress (both South Africa) and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).

So 191 delegations were represented in all, 140 speeches were given and the conference cost an estimated $50m to hold.

A parallel event was held by private organisations in the Kenyan capital, attended mainly by ecological groups from all over the world but not including a group from Germany.

American ecologists were the most forthright in their attacks on the US delegation at the conference and on the final document.

In a free news-sheet distributed during the conference the Reagan administration was attacked daily and billed as a meddler that was completely isolated.

The United States did indeed have difficulty in holding its own not only against the developing countries but also, in some cases, against Western countries.

Its only ally was, oddly enough, the Soviet Union and its satellites, which were likewise opposed, albeit for different reasons, to fresh financial obligations and new institutions.

Yet the ecological groups lodged no protest against the Soviet bloc.

But there can be no talk of the United States being seriously isolated since important sections of the final conference document bore the US imprint.

What is more, the document was eventually unanimously approved, without objections or reservations by the developing countries.

Time and again the Nairobi action programme refers to the developing countries' own responsibility for helping to develop their resources and for contributing towards the funding of projects.

They were also to lay the groundwork for private investment from abroad and to join forces with other developing countries in regional cooperation.

All the Soviet bloc succeeded in having included in the action programme was a reference to disarmament, but not in the way the Soviet Union had intended.

It did not refer to Western armament being brought to a halt and the funds thereby made available being allocated to the developing world.

The final document eventually included a simple statement that "specific progress towards the objectives of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would make substantial extra funds available."

These could then be invested in energy supplies.

Of the 133 developing countries recognised as such, the conference secretariat announced, 90 have oil reserves of their own, some substantial.

According to IMF figures their combined balance-of-payments deficit has increased from $7bn in 1970 to $97bn this year.

The conference was called to deal with hydroelectric power, firewood and charcoal, biomass, solar energy, geothermic heat, wind power, oil shale, bitumen sand, tidal power, heat layers in the sea, draught animals and peat as new and renewable energy resources.

The most important immediate task was felt to be reafforestation on a grand scale.

Günter Krabbe

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 24 August 1981)

Opec disunity leaves future unclear

Maybe it was just the simple ... tion that it does not do to ... goose that lays the golden eggs ... was more subtle insights into ... tional market forces.

At all events Saudi Arabian Petro... Minister Yamani again pulled a ... the eternal advocates of higher oil p... at the Geneva meeting of Opec's ... tative council.

The failure of the Geneva con... to reach agreement among the ... countries leaves us none the wiser ... future price trends on oil markets.

But it could have been worse ... Libyans, Algerians or Nigerians ... the day with their views on oil pri...

Saudi Arabia accounts for ... per cent of Opec's oil output, ... the largest producer in membership ... it is keen on steady price developm...

Not so other Opec members ... enamoured of the oil weapon they ... they have at their command and ... completely lost sight of the interests ... the industrialised countries.

The current glut on world oil ma... ought indeed to sound a warning ... to profiteering producers.

It is symptomatic on the one h... economic recession in the industri... countries, due on no small meas... the increasingly heavy burden of ... prices.

On the other it testifies to the ... effect of drastic cuts by oil con... and a switch to alternative ... resources.

These may be recommended t... West by Arab statesmen, but they ... not keen on their advice being follo... with such alacrity either.

Sheikh Yamani wants neither to co... jure the prospect of economic col... by the industrialised countries ... prompt an energy technology br... through by the West.

Given the imaginative flair of W... tern scientists this is by no means ... rely out of the question and would ... Opec to stew in its own juice.

Libya could certainly be cited ... warning example. Colonel Gaddafi ... largely priced himself out of intern... nal oil markets.

A moderating effect on the mark... terplay of supply and demand has ... exercised by many oil strikes in ... years in non-Opec countries.

This is a reference not only to N... Sea oil or Alaskan oil and Canadian ... tumen sand but also to Mexico, ... the state petroleum corporation has ... announced details of a major new ... tract to supply the United States.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 22 August ...)

Continued from page 1

tente concept. As the Reagan administration sees it is was merely an expression of a temporary weakness of the USA as a world power in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate.

This weakness was adroitly used by the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan and go ahead with a massive arms build-up in both the conventional and nuclear sectors.

So Mr Reagan's main objective is to show the Soviet Union who is boss again all over the world and to redress the balance of power that has indeed been upset by the Kremlin in Europe.

America feels understanding can only be reached with Russia once the United States has regained the No. 1 status to which it feels entitled.

Conservative US opinion feels this will only be the case once America is ahead of the Soviet Union militarily, politically and morally.

Paying the piper

Then, and then only, or so Mr Reagan reckons, will the Russians be interested in negotiations.

This policy of reactivating American values of old naturally has a domestic function. Its purpose is to reweld crisis-prone US society back into a homogeneous unit by means of a clear and unanimous view as to who is the enemy.

The Reagan administration's assessment of Russia's inordinate arms build-up may be accurate enough, but not so the policy the President presumes to follow as a result.

This policy runs the risk of thinking only in terms of conflicts and losing sight of the interests the two blocs share.

This assigns to the medium-sized powers of Western Europe the correspondingly more important task of putting a damper on US claims to have arrived at the only accurate assessment of the situation.

Herr Genscher clearly appreciates that no one European country pulls enough weight to be sure of a hearing in Washington.

Only a politically united Europe could assume a buffer function between the blocs, but the prospects are poor. In the 70s, when the United States pulled out of many international commitments, Europe missed the opportunity of donning the mantle of a world policeman.

Given the intensification of East-West clashes, all Bonn can now do is to reformulate its own interests and counteract growing feelings of impotence.

The United States will soon have to realise that its power alone is not enough to ensure No. 1 status in the world and that it needs Europe just as Western Europe cannot afford to dispense with US protection.

Werner Birkenmaier

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 15 August 1981)

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Variety of theories on Opposition's silence

...he Opposition has ignored the chance to show the nation what it ...d do if it were in power.

...nn's budget programme of financial ...nity should have made sweeping ...ges. It didn't.

...nd no sooner had the SPD/FDP ...ed the programme than a tug of ... began over the surtax on income ...

...t the CDU/CSU opposition re...ed silent.

... is the silence of the silent majority. ... opinion survey show that, if elec... were held right now, the CDU/C... would corner about 50 per cent of ...votes. This would mean that it could ...n even without the FDP.

...t premature elections are unlikely, ... if the differences between the ...tion partners increase and even ...ld the coalition break down.

...ere are, however, more and more ...ations that the conservatives, who ... been in the opposition for the past ...years, will take over the reins in ...n in the foreseeable future.

...o, it is only natural that the public ...ld like to know what the conserva...s would do to pull the cart out of ... bog. If the conservatives now came ... with a convincing programme they ...ld – perhaps – hasten the rethink... process within the FDP and so pave ... way for a conservative/liberal go...nment.

Little more than polemics has all that ...far has been heard.

Opposition leader Helmut Kohl term... the government's austerity pro...amme and "admission of defeat and ...ankruptcy" and CSU chairman Franz Josef Strauss called it "a programme to milk the citizen".

This is the sort of strong language one expects of an opposition but it is no substitute for a genuine alternative programme.

Only Gerhard Stoltenberg, Schleswig-Holstein's prime minister and economic affairs spokesman of the CDU, has intimated that his party has a up its sleeve that his party has a card up its sleeve which it is not yet prepared to play.

He said that the CDU/CSU would take a clear stand in the Bundestag and Bundesrat debates after the summer recess.

But this is a very cautious announcement since it is only to be expected of the opposition that it take a stand on the many amendments of laws that would become necessary if the government programme were to be implemented.

But this does not mean that a genuine opposition programme will transpire in the process.

In fact, it is pretty safe to assume that the conservatives have no programme apart from a few general principles. It is inconceivable that such a programme could have remained secret. The public would have been bound to learn about it once the party executive board was called upon to approve the blueprint.

Nothing like this has happened so far. Granted, some studies have probably been made by experts, but it is certain that the CDU/CSU could not present a programme were it called on to take over the reins of government from one day to the next.

There are several schools of thought as to the reasons for the Opposition's restraint, some believe that working out such a programme would reveal the same differences within the coalition.

Others say the CDU/CSU is pretty certain that it will not get a chance to form a government before the 1984 elections; and others again simply go along with the CSU chairman's suggestion to let the government parties stew in their own juice.

All this could be quite right. In fact, the opposition's attitude is probably wise in tactical terms. It's like with a theatre play: you cannot be panned for those parts of the play that you deleted in the first place. In other words, a programme that has not been put forward cannot be criticised.

Yet the Opposition's silence leaves us with a big void. After all, there is no necessity to come up with a comprehensive programme to reduce indebtedness and put the budget back on a sound footing – a programme with hundreds of details. But the public has a right to know what the opposition's basic ideas are and how it would master the problems.

There is no getting away from the question: is there a leadership problem at the bottom of this restraint?

Helmut Kohl has gained in political stature – largely due to the last election campaign – but he is no Konrad Adenauer or Ludwig Erhard with a personality forceful and convincing enough to point the way to his party.

Besides, he is not exactly an expert on economics.

Strauss, on the other hand, has all the necessary expertise and is full of ideas but – like Stoltenberg – he is far removed from Bonn and its decision-making processes.

And Kurt Biedenkopf, the CDU's most imaginative economist, has been pushed even more to the periphery of events.

The public seems to be aware of this weakness. It is conspicious that the CDU/CSU is far ahead of the SPD in terms of popularity as a party but not in terms of personalities. Here, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is far ahead of any conservative politician.

This is also one of the main reasons why, despite growing differences with the SPD, the FDP sticks to its current coalition partner.

Doubts as to Kohl's ability to take over Schmidt's office – and he is so far the only conservative candidate in sight – are as widespread among the Free Democrats as they are among the public at large.

It is probably true that most voters would like to see a changing of the guard in Bonn, but they would vote for the CDU/CSU for lack of a suitable alternative rather than out of any deep-rooted conviction.

The opposition's silence is hardly the way to allay these reservations.

Wolfgang Wagner

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 8 August 1981)

FDP 'would survive swap'

The FDP would survive a coalition change and poll the five per cent it needs to stay in the Bonn Bundestag if it opted for a coalition with the CDU/CSU, an opinion survey shows.

The Liberals would lose only 10 per cent of their vote.

The confidential survey commissioned by FDP general secretary Günter Verheugen shows that FDP voters who consider the SPD an ideal coalition partner have dwindled from 80 per cent in October 1980 to 56 per cent now.

But 77 per cent of FDP voters still favour a continued coalition with the SPD until the end of this legislative period. Yet only 34.7 per cent want this at any cost.

Should no agreement be reached on the 1982 budget or should there be other fundamental political differences, 41.4 per cent of FDP voters would favour a coalition with the Christian Democrats before the end of the legislative period.

Some 23.4 per cent would prefer the FDP to go into opposition if it fell out with the SPD.

The FDP leaders do not regard these figures as an invitation to break with the present coalition partner. But they do enable the the Liberals to act with more self-assurance.

FDP leaders stress that the survey confirms that five per cent of the electorate are dyed-in-the wool Free Democrat voters.

dpa

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 17 August 1981)

Liberals test temperature in case

It has long been obvious that the 1982 federal budget proposals would put the SPD/FDP coalition to the test.

The most obvious crack in the unity is the proposal to put a surtax on income tax.

But that is just one of many.

The wrangle over the budget was probably the reason the FDP decided to make a survey of what would happen if it dropped the SPD as a coalition partner.

The results show that it would lose a third of its electorate. But it would gain 25 per cent on the original figure, a net loss of less than 10 per cent.

The party's secretary-general, Günter Verheugen, who is known as a clever tactician, had little choice but to release these findings. But he stressed that this had nothing to do with the current situation in Bonn.

But this means taking the public for a fool – even assuming that the FDP has no intention of breaking with the SPD in the autumn.

The strategy is of the more long-term nature; but even so, all the preliminary work serves the same objective: should the coalition break up, the blame must be seen to lie squarely with the SPD to enable the liberals to switch partners without loss of face.

For instance: should the Social Democrats insist on the surtax on income tax in the autumn talks or should they make other unacceptable demands, the Free Democrats would be in a position to either mitigate or aggravate the crisis.

At the end of July, Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher ended the first round of the budgetary tug-of-war in disagreement, whereupon the Chancellor went on holiday and the foreign minister to the preparatory North-South conference in Mexico.

The break in the dispute could help to cool tempers. But so far as concrete issues are concerned Genscher has become even more implacable.

And even should the dispute be smoothed out, the next disagreement is only around the corner. It could break out on the SPD in Munich or it could occur after the delegates to the congress have arrived at their resolutions towards the end of April – resolutions that could be at odds with the Chancellor's ideas on the Nato arms decisions.

Helmut Schmidt has taken precautionary measures by intimating the possibility of a compromise and at the same time stressing that decisions of this nature must be made by the Bundestag and the government rather than at party congresses – as laid down by the Constitution.

This would mean that he would act contrary to party congress resolutions if necessary, staking everything on the necessary majority in parliament.

The question now is whether his coalition partner will go along. After all, the FDP could also seize this opportunity to say that the Chancellor has been left in the lurch by his own party.

So far as the legislative period as a while is concerned (it extends into 1984) the FDP will have to consider its moves in case Schmidt throws in the towel and the Social Democrats decide to continue the coalition with a different Chancellor.

Occasional hints made by Schmidt have kept the discussion of this possibility going.

All this has fired the imagination, and speculation as to what would happen in such a case is rife. The FDP would probably find itself in hot water if Schmidt were to remain Chancellor until the end of the legislative period and at the same time make it clear that he would withdraw after the 1984 election.

Imaginative Social Democrats are already on the lookout for a successor, though the way they see it such a man should replace Schmidt as early as 1983 or should at least pay a so prominent role in government as to enable him to build up his image before the 1984 election.

Be this as it may, nobody knows for sure what Schmidt's decision will be – particularly the FDP.

For this very reason the liberals want to be prepared for every contingency. The fact is that the liberals are no longer so vociferous in stressing that they entered into the coalition agreement with Schmidt as Chancellor.

It would certainly be wrong to assume that the FDP leadership has already decided to switch of coalition partners.

But there are signs to indicate that, as the difficulties within the coalition grow, there is also a growing inclination among the liberals to familiarise themselves with the idea of an end to the social-liberal era.

This will add to the difficulties and ease the search for a political alibi and the apportionment of blame. This is how to make the voter toe the line.

Hans Reiser

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 August 1981)

■ POLITICS

The season never ends for the men with a barrow to push, Bonn's lobbyists

The season never stops for Bonn lobbyists. They have their say in the heated discussion over the federal budget as much as they do over setting tolerance levels for exhaust fumes.

Those who want to have an official voice must be listed in the Public Register of Associations and their Representatives.

The Federal Gazette (issue 105) contains a supplement of 180 pages that lists more than 1,000 lobbyists, ranging from the Sewer Technology Association to the Association for Organic and Organic Mineral Fertilisers.

These 1,000 lobbyists represent just about every association worth its name in this country.

The supplement lists the name and domicile of the association, its executive board and number of members as well as the full address of the Bonn representative office.

There are such tiny organisations as the Work Group of Medium-Sized Oil Refineries with its ten members and the Association of Long-Life Milk Exporters (13 members) and such mammoths as the German Trade Union Federation with its 7.7 million card-carrying members and the German Automobile Club representing 6.6 million motorists.

Of course, not all of the associations listed have a Bonn representative office. Even the powerful National Federation of German Industry makes do with an office in neighbouring Cologne.

But by and large, the more important organisations have either an office or a liaison agency in Germany's capital because experience shows that the closer to Bonn the better the prospects.

Yet while the names, addresses and objectives of the lobbyists are public property it is extremely difficult to shed light on their inner workings.

The more solid lobbyists see themselves as honest brokers between their own interests and those of the public at large.

They consider themselves dialogue partners with expert knowledge in a particular field who, if necessary, will put up a formidable opposition but are always a help to the lawmakers' decision-making processes.

In fact, Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff clearly says that the legislators could not work effectively if it were not for the lobbyists.

They maintain their contacts with the MPs by telephone and at parties and their main objective is to act in good time.

As a result, they enter the law-making processes at the earliest possible stage, knowing how difficult it is to achieve anything once a bill has been drafted.

The close relations between lobbyists and lawmakers stem from the fact that many MPs who have failed to get re-elected or do not wish to serve another term become lobbyists, bringing all their contacts into this business.

The same goes for former high-ranking civil servants whom the associations welcome with open arms.

Seen in this light, it is not surprising that all parliamentary doors open readily to people like Dr Siegfried Mann, former state secretary and now manager of the National Federation of German Industry.



But even the lower echelon of civil servants can be useful inasmuch as it is these people rather than Cabinet members who actually make day-to-day policy.

A Cologne economist, for instance, found extremely close links between the Agriculture Ministry's department for the sugar business and the Sugar Business Association.

He found that the department at the Ministry is understaffed because, as an Association member outs it: "We do all the work for the department."

Yet in spite of Count Lambsdorff's high opinion of the lobbyists, there can be no doubt that they frequently harm the public interest.

For example, the law for protection from harmful substances, generally known as the Anti-Pollution Act: legislators barely stood a chance because all major decisions were made in talks between civil servants and the chemicals industry.

And since the Chemical Workers Union was consulted in the deal, the final Act corresponded pretty exactly to the deal made in the Bundestag corridors.

The lobbyists know very well who they can count on. Says one Bonn insider: "The farmers always find a ready ear at the Agriculture Ministry where price guarantees and subsidies are concerned. And the industrialists can always be sure to find a ready listener at the Economic Affairs Ministry when it comes to safeguarding the market economy."

And it goes without saying that the Civil Service Association is listened to readily at the Interior Ministry (which is in charge of the civil service).

Of course, things become more complicated when rivalling associations try to get the upper hand over each other.

One of the more recent examples was the tug-of-war over certain privileges for savings banks which were opposed by the commercial bankers on the grounds that such provisions would give the savings banks an edge.

This time, the savings banks got the upper hand.

On another occasion, the commercial banks were successful in curtailing certain tax privileges for the savings banks.

The power and influence of the associations naturally depend on the political constellation in Bonn. Veteran lobbyists for the business community make no bones about the fact that their interests and those of the CDU coincide and that they were admirably suited when the CDU was in power.

For instance, industry had no trouble at all in preventing more stringent anti-trust legislation despite Ludwig Erhard's wish to introduce it.

It was not until the SPD/FDP coalition came to power that a more stringent amendment to the law was passed.

By the same token, trade union lobbyists now naturally have it easier in Bonn than in the Erhard and Adenauer eras.

Chancellor Schmidt, for instance, ... to surround himself with high c... people who would reject the word "lob-byists" as applied to themselves.

The dividing line between a lob... in the strict sense and promoters of cer-tain interests who have top level con-tacts is blurred.

The questions are:

- Are the intrigues in Bonn and the methods used by the lobbyists al-ways above board?
- Do the associations engage in ... and how do companies that do bu... with the government conduct this busi-ness?
- Are there special accounts from ... to draw more than just expenses?

The spokesman for an auto... concern says that everything is ... board. And other lobbyists stress ... German methods cannot be ... with those in some banana rep...

The way things stand in Bonn, every-body watches everybody else. But sea-soned lobbyists and MPs admit ... there are black sheep.

And even lobbyists consider the ... business below standard in this ... — especially since the memory of cer-tain affairs involving our political p... still lingers.

Are the lobbyists our true p... makers? Hardly; because the div... and frequently clashing interests ... them largely nullify each other.

But there is nevertheless the d... of our becoming a "state of associations" in which individual interests are ... represented.

Politicians should be duty-bound ... become fully aware of this danger ... to champion those interests that ... under-represented in Bonn.

But the question here is whether ... liticians can become aware of the i... ests of the weak. The outcome of ... tug-of-war over Bonn finances cou... provide an answer.

Bolke Behrens

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 1 August 1981)

Social portrait of Bundestag reveals little change

There are more civil servants than ever in the Bundestag despite a reduction of financial privileges they used to enjoy.

For example, civil service pensions are not now payable on top of an MP's salary.

A survey now published reveals an amazing continuity in the social structure of the Bundestag.

The old Bundestag, before the election last year, had 170 civil servants or 32.8 per cent. The new one has 173 (33 per cent). The number of actual civil servants, i.e. administrative government officers, has risen from 99 to 102 and that of teachers at all levels from 37 to 40. (Government school teachers are part of the civil service in Germany.)

The changes within the civil service group of MPs are also significant. In the previous Bundestag, the CDU/CSU had 85 civil service MPs compared with 77 for the SPD. In the current Bundestag, this ratio has shifted to 79 against 84 in favour of the SPD.

One hypothesis that has been put forward as an explanation is that the SPD is increasingly developing into a civil service party in parliament.

The dominance of the civil service in the Bundestag is unaffected by the fact that the number of government and public sector employees (as opposed to civil servants) in parliament has dropped from 37 to 34.

According to the study, the current Bundestag has 238 union members of whom 101 are members of the public sector workers union. Yet the metalworkers union, which has two-and-a-half time as many members as the public sector workers union provides only 34 MPs.

Taking the public service in the broadest sense and including members of the teachers, railway workers, social workers and police unions, the number of public sector union members rises to 153 or 64.3 per cent of all unionists in the Bundestag.

Another indication of the continuity in the sociological structure of the parliament is the distribution of party, trade union and cultural institution employees.

Their number has dropped marginally from 70 to 63.

But unlike with the civil servants, the proportion of these MPs in terms of CDU/CSU and SPD members has shifted from 23 for the conservatives and 45 for the SPD in the old Bundestag t... ratio of 16 to 44 in the new one.

There has been no change so far ... the under-representation of housewives (8) and blue collar workers (12) is con-cerned. But here we must bear in mind that many former blue collar workers have become party or trade union em-ployees.

The study shows that the number ... private sector white collar workers in ... Bundestag has dropped from 59 to 5...

There is a conspicuous increase in the number of self-employed, who pro... 73 MPs, accounting for 14.1 per c... (compared with 64 or 12.4 per cent ... the previous Bundestag).

This is largely due to a heavier rep-sentation of the environmentalists ... has benefited primarily the conserv... and the liberals.

The number of self-employed far... has risen from 19 to 24.

Other self-employed professions ... lawyers, doctors, architects and tax co... sellors have swelled their ranks from ... to 63, the lawyers (39 against 35 in ... previous Bundestag) being the lar... group in this category.

But figures are deceptive in this ... inasmuch as a closer look shows ... number of civil servants who, under ... new law, have to quit the civil ... on accepting their mandates, ... ed, law practices. They include ... others, Dr Wolfgang Schäuble ... and Franz Müller (CDU).

Volker ...

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 18 August 1981)

THE MEDIA

Presses roll with Germany's only newspaper in Japanese

...he first Japanese language newspaper ...s being published in Germany. *Doitsu Shinpo*, which means German ...st News, has a circulation of 30,000. ...ppears on the 1 and 15 of the month ... will be sold in Germany, Austria, ...itzerland, the Benelux countries and ...pan.

Most Japanese living in these coun-...s cannot speak German well enough ... read German papers.

Up to now they have had to rely on ...-mailed Japanese publications, which ... often out of date by the time they ...ive, or English publications.

...*Shinpo* is a quality, serious newspaper ...ith a rather staid, unflashy layout. Its ...ening pages are mainly devoted to po-...ics and economics. Its aim is clearly to ...ake up for the news-deficit of Japa-...se living here.

The topics dealt with in the first issue ...ould hardly have been more topical: ...xpenditure cuts in Bonn, abuse of the ...nemployment benefit scheme, 20 years of the Berlin Wall, the GDR's economic report for the first half of 1981 and a report on the GDR's foreign debt which contrasted strongly with the optimism of the official GDR report.

The newspaper also carried reports on ...rope and the European Community as ...ell as on the problems in Poland and ...itterrand's atomic energy policy.

The 24-page newspaper will carry re-...lar features on German companies — ...e first was on Hapag-Lloyd. It will be ...resenting portraits of German cities — ...e first was on Cologne.

It has the usual culture, travel and ...omen's sections plus a special service ...r readers explaining where for example ...o find ticket dispensing machines for ...e underground and how to operate ...em. It explains the incomprehensible ...breviations used in the second hand ...r sections of German newspapers.

I was most impressed by the quality ...f the articles before they were trans-...ted into Japanese: the women's ...age, for example, is better than in most ...erman newspapers.

In the first issue there is a feature on ... Daimler Benz worker and his family. The article looks closely at the family's ...onthly budget — what the wife earns, ...xpenditure, how much the wife has to ...arn to make ends meet, whether the ...amily can afford the house it is plan-...ing to build.

Doitsu Shinpo is printed in Düssel-...dorf and written in Bonn. It still has a ...umber of technical and financial prob-...lems.

Editor-in-chief is 39-year-old Hiroshi Takagi, who came to this country in 1966, studied at the Folkwang School in Essen and then worked as a photogra-...pher for the *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in Essen.

After that he worked for four years at the German Embassy in Tokyo before ...eturning to West Germany to plan and ...dit the newspaper.

He is the only linguist on the paper's ...staff. He speaks German and English ...fluently. He therefore has the unenviable ...task of translating articles written in English by German journalists into Japanese.

Tagaki was unable to find a German journalist with perfect Japanese or a Japanese journalist with a thorough knowledge of German.

Tagaki has taken on a job of work which would make most German editors-in-chief cringe.

Those who know anything about Japanese financial planning will not be surprised to learn that the paper is on a sound financial footing and that nothing has been left to chance.

Only fifty per cent of the paper's circulation is bound for Germany and the neighbouring countries. The other half will got to Japan, where it will be read mainly by employees of the big Japanese export companies who do business with the Federal Republic of Germany. German-Japanese trade is increasing every year.

The paper offers a fifty per cent discount to German firms who want to advertise their products on the German market. The paper in Germany and neighbouring countries will be available on aeroplanes, in all major hotels and in every town. Germany's first Japanese language newspaper does not intend to hide its light under a bushel.

Hasso Ziegler

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 15 August 1981)



Hiroshi Takagi with his new paper ... filling a gap. (Photo: Jupp Darchinger)

Plan to break into TV in America

Radio Deutsche Welle plans breaking into the American and Canadian television market.

Programmes from West Germany's first and second channels would be transmitted via satellite after being dubbed into English.

It is anticipated that the scheme will be financed by advertising from both German and American firms.

According to the administrative director of Deutsche Welle, Dr Heinz Fellhauer, the project would break even if advertising rates were DM 2,880 a minute and four minutes an hour were sold.

Royalties for the programmes would be just DM 120 a minute and satellite channels would be rented at DM 120,000 per channel.

He says no new staff would be needed.

The financing aspects are importand because Deutsche Welle is cutting back on costs.

Staff members have even been sent a memo from the director, Klaus Schütz, urging the need for saving.

Nobody could accuse the Deutsche Welle in Cologne of being inconspicuous. The huge building on the corner of Gürtelstrasse and Bonnstrasse is something of a monstrosity.

Yet despite this and despite its 3,000 staff who put together programmes in 33 languages which are broadcast throughout the world, the station is something of an unknown quantity to the the general public.

Of course there have always been scandals and sensations. According to its statutes and structure, the DW is close to the Bonn government and there have been times when the station has fallen over backwards to be nice to it.

The reason for this obligingness can be found in the regulations: "The DW is financed not from licence fees but from a direct government grant."

This explains why the Bonn government can lean more heavily on DW than on the public corporation and commercial radio stations.

DW's radio and administrative councils are completely Bonn-dominated. Chairman of the Administrative Council is former Bonn minister Bruno Heck, and his deputy is secretary of state Manfred Schüler.

As saving money is now the priority in Bonn, DW also had to obey this political imperative.

The planned DW television programmes for Canada and the United States are excluded from the savings.

Everything is still confidential. The director and the radio and administrative councils will, of course, have the final say but the latter certainly does not yet know details of the television scheme.

And most TV viewers and radio listeners in this country probably do not know either that has its own television programme and programme distribution system: the Transtel company and its subsidiary e-te-s (European Television Service) with a DW staff of 80, including three cameramen and two assistant cameramen.

The new television company will be planned and produced quite independently of Transtel.

The planning paper reads: "The production of a German radio and TV programme for the USA comes within the area of responsibilty of DW."

There are some at Deutsche Welle who consider these financial calculations optimistic to euphoric and ask whether their present staff can cope with such problems as dubbing foreign programmes into English.

DW has already bad experience of commercial programmes — in its station in Antigua in the Caribbean. DW is hoping here to emulate the success which Téléfrance USA has had since 1978 in the USA.

Téléfrance rented two channels of the US satellite SATCOM I in May 1980 and now broadcasts a daily three-hour programme from France which is subsequently broadcast via 215 cable TV stations.

The programme reaches over five million US households — 20 million viewers.

The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bonn Press and Information Office were delighted to hear the DW's calculations: they are only too pleased to encourage propaganda and cultural activities abroad, especially when they cost nothing.

So permission for this avowedly commercial TV programme was not long coming.

Beate Schachtsieck

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 8 August 1981)

■ THE ECONOMY

Pros and cons of swings and roundabouts

Three out of ten is the highest mark one could give to German monetary and economic policy in the past year. And even this mark is flattering.

A basically healthy economy has been confused and discouraged by too much talk about the value of money and incorrect public finance policies.

What the Bundestag wants is one thing, what the Bonn government and its budgetary experts do is another.

These policies are only coordinated in one sense: they damage the economy and worsen what is called "the crisis."

The problems began with the sharp rise in oil prices in 1979. As a result the West German balance of payments, which until then had been one of the strong points of our economy, plunged into the red — a deficit DM30bn.

It was therefore quite natural and in accordance with the laws of the market that the value of the mark should then sink, especially against the dollar.

The Bundesbank, however, had nothing better to do than to waste currency reserves supporting the deutschemark — to prevent the value of the dollar rising. It argued that oil bills are paid in dollars and that oil became more expensive with every rise in its value.

This is correct but one-sided view. After all, higher exchange rates for the dollar also help German exports because German products on the world markets become cheaper and therefore more competitive as a result. So the Bundesbank used up currency reserves and reduced our export prospects.

The result of this policy was depressing. A huge chunk of German currency reserves have been used up but this has not prevented the dollar rising from DM1.75 to DM2.50. Our exports took some time to start improving.

Bundesbank president Karl Otto Pöhl paid several billion marks for the lesson that worldwide market forces cannot he stopped by manipulations with currency reserves.

The second reason for the ailing state of the economy has nothing to do with the Bundesbank.

Herr Pöhl is quite right to say that the Bonn government left him in the lurch in his efforts to defend the value of the deutschemark.

It is, of course, as true as ever that the German oil bill rises with the value of the dollar. The consequence should have been to keep the oil bill down by appropriate government measures.

One way of doing this would have been programmes to mobilise alternative energy, with higher tax relief and perhaps even subsidies. But nothing at all happened — apart from measures already passed. So despite the German's proven willingness to save energy, the oil bill went on rising.

And by failing to introduce new energy policies the government also missed an oppottunity to boost the construction industry and help medium-sized companies.

The Bundesbank's high interest policy also prevented companies and private individuals from taking their own initiatives.

The Bundesbank says that the purpose of its high-interest policy is to precent even more money being transferred to the United States, which with its high-interest rates is now an investor's paradise. Withdrawals would worsen West Germany's already negative balance of payments, the Bundesbank argued.

On the other hand, it prevents the struggle against the real cause of the deficit — high energy costs.

Government spending — and not just the Bundesbank — is another factor behind the high interest rates. The government's need to finance its public spending programme pushed money market rates even higher.

Clearly there was a gap between the supply and the demand for capital — and according to the laws of the market economy this was bound to push up the price of money i.e., interest rates.

The question remains: what kind of money has been attracted by our high interest rates? And there is only one answer to this — the money needed for private investment.

An investor who can buy government bonds with guaranteed returns and free of all risk is not going to take the risk of investing in private companies, where the return is uncertain.

This means that the investor has in fact become a lender who puts his money into the state's fast-running debt-making machinery.

But this is not all. High interest rates have raised costs in many industries, in the storage sector and the building industry for instance. This meant that super interest rates had both a price-raising and a depressive effect. And no one thought of introducing interest-subsidies for energy-saving investments.

This would have entailed longer-term planning, would have presupposed an overall economy strategy. But because



nothing at all had happened, time also began to run out.

The ailing economy means that there was an even bigger deficit in the state budget.

And so consolidation of the state budget and reduction of debts became the new credo. Here the government had to act.

And it did — but not convincingly. A balanced budget is not everything. It depends on how the budget is balanced.

The government lacked a brain such as one-time super-minister Karl Schiller. Under the pressure of circumstances neither Economic Affairs Minister Lambsdorff nor Finance Minister Matthöfer were capable coming up wijh convincing medium-term financial policies.

Lambsdorff extolled the advantages of the market economy and Matthöfer stressed the need for a balanced budget.

Otherwise neither came up with anything noteworthy. From the beginning the government disregarded the most important consideration of all — namely that in a period of economic depression an economic and financial programme must boost the confidence of industry.

Instead, the government spread gloom. Everyone who heard the talk about consolidation of the budget had the impression that he ought to tighten his belt. And this did not of course, mean an improvement in the overall standard of living. And producers observing all these trends consequently did nothing to boost their productivity and create new jobs.

Record interest rates and tax rises — these are the results so far of an economic policy which ought to be trying to resuscitate our economy. Both these measures tend to depress the economy.

They could mean that by next year the economy is in an even worse situation, despite all the saving: that is if increasing revenue is cancelled out by higher unemployment payments and social expenditure increases for the same reason.

Instead of optimism and progressive dynamism the government's only solution to the unemployment problem is to impose a special supplement which is no more than a disguised tax increase.

In other words, the SPD ministers at least want to squeeze wage earners and put the money thus gained into a programme aimed somehow at boosting employment.

In reality, the result of these efforts will be more unemployment, because those hit by the supplement will mainly be thus capable of giving the economy a shot in the arm: small and medium-sized businessmen and better-paid white collar workers.

The effect of the special supplement will be to demonstrate to these people that there is little point in working harder to earn more. And their money will be pumped into public spending programmes were civil servants will cause it to sink without trace.

The public spending programmes of the past five years have demonstrated that hardly a penny more comes out of such measures than is put into them.

They do not, as they once did, have an economy-boosting effect. All they finally achieve is a redistribution of income — even though the government does not like the phrase.

However, redistribution of income is not necessarily evil. A redistribution or levelling-off of incomes can boost the economy. When working-class income rose to equal that of the middle classes, the effect on the economy was dynamic — indeed it was this which first made mass production and mass affluence possible.

Pension reform has given the aged more spending power and thus helped to open up many new markets.

These were large-scale redistributions. This time a comparatively small number of creative and managerial workers are being asked to pay the bill.

Their contribution will not be so very great. Private economic activities are … being redistributed — to the state, wh… has yet to demonstrate that it is m… capable of doing them than private e… terprise.

The effect of this kind of thing is d… pressing. And it means that the gu… ians of our finances are manoeuv… themselves into a situation which co… have disastrous consequences — t… production of new deficits caused … paralysis of the economic will.

Few company bosses know whe… things are leading. So they are all sitt… on the fence, waiting to see what ha… pens.

We will soon know the details of t… government's expenditure cuts. By th… it will be autumn and new moves … not have any effect until next year. … same applies to state expenditure p… gramme, whichever department has … make sacrifices to finance them.

Next year, this country will face … very tricky situation. Assuming that … interest rates remain as high as they a… this means that in 1982/83 all those … who took up cheap five-year building … society loans will have to pay twice a… much in mortgage repayments — witho… a corresponding rise in their income.

More money than ever will then g… into paying for houses which have lo… since been built. This money will b… taken away from consumer spending… The result of this process is unlikely t… be optimism. It would point the way t… another downward spiral. The effect … this would be that austerity would cre… austerity until there was nothing left t… be austere about.

It is difficult to give advice in such … difficult situation. But two things shou… be noted: neither the Bonn governme… nor the Bundesbank have a plan, l… alone a joint plan.

And lack of plans in a dangero… economic situation regularly leads … bitty, unimaginative action. There are … signs of a thinker capable of suggesti… bold options. And the contradictory re… ommendations of the economics profe… sors don't help much.

A stagnant economy can only pick i… self off the floor if its energies are r… leased rather boosts, not special la… And it needs a long-term concer… financial strategy, not panic mo… which break the basis of the contr… between the state and its citizens.

The Federal Republic of Germany … needlessly slithering towards a crisis.

But it is not an economic crisis … a crisis of confidence.

Günter Buschi…

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonnt… 26 August 19…)

Outlook for 1982

Ifo predictions for 1981 and 1982

	1980	1981	1982
Economic performance change in per cent	+1.8	−1	+1.5 to +2
Unemployed in millions	0.9	over 1.2	1.5
Price increases in per cent	+5.4	+5.5	over 4
Current account in DMbn	−30	−25	under −20

TRADE

Huge rise in export risk compensation payouts

…t year German export risk insur… paid out DM641m in compen… twice as much as in the previ… and ten times more than five …

…nment guarantees for foreign … in 1981 rose 13.5 per cent to … in 1980. This is equivalent to … than the government's total revenue from income tax.

…high pay-outs last year were due …rous bankruptcies in Turkey and … of the sum was covered by … from previous years when pay… were low and premium payments …

…the Bonn Ministry of Economic … is not unduly alarmed at the … of its export guarantee insurance …

…optimism overlooks the fact that …ncy in the world economy can …crease as debtors' opportunities of … their heads above water by … out Euro-loans decrease.

…company has not the liquid re… to pay the next set of bills, it is …ally insolvent unless it can find a … which will guarantee it a larger …

…the chances of doing so are slim. … look very closely at the financial … of small and medium-sized firms … are agreeing to loans.

…wever banks are not usually so fus… when it comes to a country's currency …, although these reserves have ex… the same function as a company's … reserves. If the banks had taken a … look at Poland's reserves, they … not have lent it the billions of … they did. It has been clear for … that Poland simply is not capable … earning the foreign currency neces… to service, let alone repay, its huge … debts.

…land is likely to cost the export …tees insurance around DM4.5bn.

…wever, Poland is not the only in… nation. The burden of Euro loans is already too heavy for most developing countries to bear. The rise in the value of the dollar has increased these debts the developing countries' major exports have become cheaper in dollar terms.

Rheinischer Merkur / Christ und Welt

Then there is the "roll-over" mechanism which means that every three or six months interest rates are adjusted according to the market rate.

This means that most Euro loans cost 18 per cent, payable in a currency which, measured against the raw materials price index, has become dearer in the past six months.

According to World Monetary Fund statistics, the developing countries' (excluding OPEC) foreign debt has doubled since 1976.

In 1980 it totalled $370bn, debt-servicing swallowed 18.2 per cent of export income as against 12.8 per cent in 1976.

Two thirds of the creditors are private individuals and banks in the industrial countries. Debt-servicing requirements in 1980 totalled $75bn as against currency reserves of $65bn. However, short term indebtedness was several times this sum.

No exact figures are available here. To get a realistic picture of the situation the best method is to pick out a number of developing countries which for Euro-loan purposes have been put into creditworthiness class III.

One can then easily imagine the situation in the lower creditworthiness classes IV, V and VI.

Some countries including, surprisingly, oilrich Venezuela — would have used up their currency reserves completely if they had not taken up new Euro loans and had imported at the same rate and maintained debt-servicing at the same level in 1980.

In other words, only the taking up of new loans prevented these countries from becoming insolvent — at least for the time being. Their ability to pay for imports depends on whether European banks, fearing a disaster, are prepared to throw good money after bad.

How long can this go on?

Major creditors on the West bank of the Persian Gulf — by no means all OPEC countries — are chary of giving direct loans. They invest their money in the Euro banks and leave the banks to sort out their problems with creditors.

But the banks have somehow to earn the interest that they pay the sheikhs. As first-class debtors are rare at today's interest rates, they have to turn to lower-class addresses.

This resulted in the incredible loan structure of Eurodollar market, which has enabled third world and East Bloc countries to import industrial goods and pay interest on their foreign debts.

However, this depended on the credit volume of the Euro-market growing. If this growth slows — for instance as a result of lower petro-dollar surpluses — then countries who are not granted further loans because their creditworthiness is low will become insolvent.

There are already signs that this is happening. According to the last report by the Bank for International Settlements in Basle — to whom European banks report their international loans — loans to developing countries in the first quarter of 1981 dropped to $4.7bn as against. $13.1bn in the last quarter of 1980. OPEC deposits also dropped slightly.

This means there are likely to be more cases of insolvency in creditworthiness classes IV to VI — and the resultant nervousness of creditors could also affect countries in class III.

This in turn means that the German export insurance system will be faced with greater claims for compensation. And because the insurance reserves are running low, the Bonn government will have to pay the bill. German banks are at present owed DM32bn by non-European debtors, which gives some idea of how high the claims could be.

Export guarantees are going to become dearer. But they are necessary. Tens of thousands of jobs in West Germany depend on them.

Walter Wannemacher

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 14 August 1981)

Compromise is proposed over credits

Frankfurter Rundschau

The EEC Commission has made a proposal which could solve the problem of export credits.

In 1978, the USA, Japan and the EEC reached an agreement that they would not distort competition between them on export markets — particularly the export of investment goods — by granting cheap export credits. Minimum credit conditions were agreed.

Because of high interest rates, the USA now want an increase in these minimum conditions. At the moment, minimum interest rates for exports to "rich countries" rage from 8.5 to 8.75 per cent over five to eight and a half years.

The rates for "middle range" countries are 8 to 8.5 per cent with minimum rates of 7.5 per cent over five years. The rates for "poor countries" are 7.75 per cent over up to ten years. In the EEC, the French government wanted only a one per cent increase whereas the USA insisted on a much larger increase.

Brussels now expects that the USA will agree to a compromise solution by the Commission — an increase in minimum rates by up to two per cent.

Negotiations begin in October in the OECD. It is still not certain whether Japan will agree to the proposals. Japanese nominal interest rates for rich countries are 8.5 per cent.

The Brussels proposals would mean that Japan would have to charge foreign purchasers higher rates of interest. And the USA and some EEC members whose normal interest rates are about double the minimum rates would have to go on subsidising exports by lowering interest charges.

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 August 1981)

Chewing over the currency readjustment options


…ancial markets reckon there will … soon be a devaluation of the French … within the European Monetary …

… the French government believes … the time for devaluation has not yet …

…a rule, changes in the exchange … of currencies should be made … rather than later. Defending un… …tic exchange rates has never proved … worthwhile.

…the other hand, it must be admit… that the French are not, at the … moment, under very great pressure. They … introduced a strict system of cur… … controls which should enable … to get through until the budget … sessions in September — provided of … that the deutschmark is not … drawn into a revaluation current — and … is little likelihood of this.

…nce the French government has de… … on its future economic policy and … amount of its budgetary deficit, the … [illegible] of readjustments within the … European Monetary System will have to … faced.



Handelsblatt

The distortions which have already resulted from France's less developed awareness of the negative consequences of inflationary policies are already painfully evident.

This is particularly evident in trade with the Federal Republic of Germany. But France's position with other countries has also deteriorated and cries out for adjustments.

It is an open secret that West Germany is also interested in a readjustement of exchange rates within the European Currency System.

West Germany cannot in the long run allow the system simply to ignore differences in inflation rates. This would only import inflation and frustrate efforts to stabilise the German economy.

However, the option of taking the bull by the horns and revaluing the deutschemark does not arise. Admittedly it would be a psychological boost if the deutschemark were considered a candidate for revaluation.

However, for some partners in the EMS such as the Netherlands, a German revaluation would be a bitterer pill to swallow than a French devaluation as it would involve more imported inflation.

It would probably be forced to follow suit and revalue.

Another factor is that West Germany would almost certainly have to bear the main burden of a realignment within the EMS.

Because of its intervention commitments, the Bundesbank has large ECU debts — a devaluation of the franc would therefore not prove as expensive as a revaluation of the deutschemark.

Gerhard Kutscher

(Handelsblatt, 14 August 1981)

TRANSPORT

The vexed question of the canal that went on for ever

1921, the German government and Bavarian provincial government to build the Rhine-Main-Danube the "project of the century."

sixty years later, the project has not been completed, and experts es- it will not be until 2005.

critics call the controversial project economic nonsense and an environ- disaster. Bonn Minister of Trans- Volker Hauff makes no secret of scepticism about it.

canal's supporters are to be found in Bavarian government circles.

Work was interrupted by the Second War, but in 1949 the Bonn go- ment confirmed the validity of the agreement of 1921 between the Reich and the *Land* govern-

Since 1950 the canal has been work- its way with irresistible technological through Franconia from Bamberg Nuremberg, taking water from all the and rivulets on the way.

The canal is now navigable as far as Nuremberg.

But it is only being used at half-ca- city.

The original deadlines for the comple- of the plan are long since outdated. was hoped that the first ships would able to use the Main-Danube section the canal by 1985. But this is now of the question.

Former Bavarian Prime Minister Goppel, supervisory board chair- of the Rhine-Main-Danube AG, that taking the work on the Da- section into account the project not be completed until 2005.

The canal lobby is disappointed about The future of the project is still because the funds from Bavaria from the central government are dling in very slowly.

The Bavarian canal-builders are swimming against the current in a two respects. First, Bonn is very slow in ting out the necessary funds (costs the Bamberg-Kelheim section have estimated at DM2bn).

Second, public opinion has given a thumbs down to the whole scheme. They want it stopped.

The Munich government has launched counter-attack. Bavarian environment Minister Alfred Dick has asked Bonn to make up its mind whether it intends to on financing the scheme and if so by how much.

Dick said that the canal led to the of industry and jobs along its – "as is proved by the 230 new factories which have been built along the Main."

Alfons Goppel says every effort must be made to ensure that the Europe canal does not become the "flop of the cen- tury."

Goppel knows that he is echoing the thoughts of the powers that be in Mu- nich. He says that Bonn should not con- fuse thrift with a lack of economy.

And in fact the sums Bonn proposes to make available this year are not going to bring the canal much nearer comple- tion. In spring of this year Bavarian Minister of the Interior Tandler "empha- tically" called on Bonn to meet its commitments to the building of the canal.

"The reduction from DM150m to DM120m has already hit us very hard. Bavaria simply cannot accept reductions to as little as DM50m as set out in medium-term financial planning till 1984."

No one can accuse Bonn Minister of Transport Hauff of being a lobbyist for the Europe canal. When he took over the ministry, he inherited an agreement which is 60 years old and which can only be cancelled by mutual agreement.

There is no mention of the penalties for breach of contract in the agreement.

Hauff would certainly be only too pleased to find something in the small print which would enable him to withdraw from his commitments.

But as things stand he has to obey the unwritten law that pacta sunt servanda — agreements must be honoured.

Ministry of Transport officials say that the DM3.7bn so far invested is quite enough, especially as the maximum return they can expect for every mark invested is only fifty pfennigs — and even this presupposes maximum use of the canal, which is not likely.

Bavaria's Minister of Economics Jaumann replied to these criticisms by saying that there would be no negotiations about the canal agreement.

So what happens now? No one really knows for sure.

Both sides are entrenching themselves. The Bavarians are taking the bull by the horns. Interior Minister Tandler said in March: if the canal project is stopped now, irreparable damage will be done to the state's water supply.

At Geiling, near Regensburg, dams have not yet been closed and every time the water-level of the Danube exceeds a certain point serious damage is done behind them.

Work is now going on in the Altmühl valley between Kelheim and Riedenberg.

If there were an abrupt stoppage of work here, it would no longer he possible to guarantee flood prevention and very serious damage could be done.

Another Bavarian argument is that of the 630 kilometres of canal between Aschaffenburg and Passau 530 kilometres have already been built. 31 of the controversial 100-km section between Nuremberg and Kelheim have been built and another 11 kms are under construction.

There are only 56 kms of canal and three sluices to be built in the Altmühltal area.

The Rhine-Main-Danube AG and Bavarian government officials argue that it is economic madness to allow the capital that has been invested in this work to go unused.

If the Bavarians were to found their self-esteem on the motto "the more your enemies the greater your honour", then they can consider their honour very high.

One of the bitterest opponents of the canal project is the Bundesbahn (German Railways), which offered to reduce its transport charges for coal, heating oil and diesel oil by 15 per cent in Franconia. And this was in the early sixties.

The competition between rail and waterways had already begun and the laughing third party was, of course, industry.

Now that the canal is stuck in the cul-de-sac of costs, the Bundesbahn has launched a major propaganda offensive.

Ernst Haar, leader of the German Railwaymen's Union, says the money being invested in the canal should be diverted to the Bundesbahn.

And there are few at Bundesbahn headquarters in Frankfurt who would disagree.

Opinions among those living near the canal are divided. Riedenburg in the Altmühl valley depends largely on tourism.

Hoteliers and holiday home owners want guests — but a canal-scarred countryside is likely to keep guests away. They are against the canal.

But there are others who say: "If the canal has to be built, they should get it over and done with as soon as possible, so that the valley can be green again."

This is grist to the mill of the Rhine-Main-Danube AG, who keep stressing that the construction sites on and around the canal are no more than a temporary eyesore.

There is more than a grain of truth in this. There are sections of the canal, along the Main, on the Bamberg-Nuremberg section, where the canal has actually improved the countryside.

The Bavarian authorities use this to counter the arguments of the environmentalists. "As long as the money was available, no one objected to the canal. The question of whether it should be completed was completely irrelevant."

And government officials are now working on a document to prove that the taxpayer will have to bear the burden if the project is stopped.

It may not be so easy to prove this. One thing is clear: the canal will never be profitable. The DM 3bn to DM 4bn invested in it between Mainz and Regensburg can never be amortised.

A barge with a 1,500 tonne load takes over a hundred hours to get from Aschaffenburg to Passau. It has to go through over 60 sluices. The Bundesbahn can carry the same load the same distance in ten hours.

It is incredible that no one thought of this simple fact when the plans were being made 60 years ago.

But profit was not the main consideration then. The planners of the Rhine-Main-Danube canal were thinking in European dimensions. No one then gave a moment's though to the question of whether the canal port in Nuremberg with an annual capacity of 3.5 million tonnes would make a profit.

Today the criteria have changed. Only 500,000 tonnes per year are handled in Nuremberg — and so the port operates at a huge loss.

Our profit and efficiency-obsessed society judges success in terms of profitability. The Rhine-Main-Danube canal will never be profitable.

So should it just be filled in again? The environmentalists say yes — the sooner the better.

Will the Bonn government and Bavaria save money if a few finishing touches are done between Dietfurth and Kelheim and the whole project is then quietly dropped? No one in Bonn or in Munich is prepared to give a definite answer.

Decreeing an end to construction is simple enough — an administrative act. But carrying the consequences of such a decision is another matter altogether.

The controversy about whether goods could be transported more cheaply on the canal ends in hair-splitting. The canal was planned at a time when the overall transport pattern was completely different.

Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky has thrown his full weight behind the project. Austria, he says, would never be able to accept the abandonment of the project because it is "vital for Austria."

Everything to do with this "project of the century" seems relative.


The nationalised inland shipping fleets of the East Bloc countries are also very interested in the project. It is planned to internationalise the canal when it is completed. And the inland shipping companies of Western Europe tremble at the prospect of the cuthroat competition from the East.

There can be no compromises about the canal any more. It is no longer a choice between the canal or the beauty of the Altmühl valley.

If both sides decide to go on halfheartedly the project will be an even worse loss.

Whatever happens, there is unlikely to be much to celebrate on the canal's 100th anniversary in 2021.

Helmut Roesler
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 15 August 1981)



A section of the canal under construction in Altmühltal, Bavaria. (Photo: dpa)

■ EXHIBITIONS

Modern Berlin looks back at what Prussia signified


"I am at the end of my tether and long for the day when I can resign. Under the circumstances there is nothing more I can do. I can only wear myself out."

These were the words of SPD politician Otto Braun in 1932. Braun, born in East Prussia in 1872, was from 1920 to 1932 Prime Minister of Prussia. His political opponents called him, the "Red Tsar of Prussia."

Braun had no shortage of political opponents and enemies — on the right. The left-wing government he led was a strange new departure in the right-wing dominated history of the state.

"The Old Prussia is dead, long live the New Prussia", the then Prime Minister Paul Hirsch, SPD, had proclaimed optimistically in 1919. And Gustav Stresemann later described this new Prussia as a "bulwark of the Republicans." Against whom?

Against the forces of reaction. Under Braun, the state of Prussia was strictly



Symbolic machinery in foreground with triumphant gods behind. (Photo: dpa)

loyal to the Republican constitution. Reform policies were introduced aimed at bringing the civil service, the police and the judiciary — the three former pillars of Prussian democracy — under democratic control.

Letters, documents, paintings, posters, photographs, flags on the right and left — in room 31 of the Prussia exhibition opened last weekend in the Martin Gropius Building near the Berlin Wall. The scenario here is exaggerated and depressing at the same time.

Karl Ernst Herman, stage set designer at the Berlin Schaubühne Theatre, is responsible for the dramatic style of presentation of this exhibition, which has 2,000 exhibits.

The five-volume exhibition catalogue provides aids to interpretation — further supplemented by captions and explanations in the exhibition rooms.

Descriptions and explanations of the exhibits themselves are inadequate, even though the director of the exhibition, Manfred Schlenke and Gottfried Korff, its general secretary, agreed to strike a balanced between "the wish to look and the need for information."

Following the uncritical exhibitions on the Wittelsbach and Staufer families in Munich and Stuttgart respectively, the exhibition organisers were anxious to avoid a nostalgic display of the glory that was dynastic Prussia and a dry, matter-of-fact presentation.

In this they have succeeded admirably. The 4,000sq.m. exhibition, covering two floors and a huge, restored court well of this Gründerzeit building, overcomes the handicap of having no exhibits from East Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland, whose territories now include parts of what was once Prussia.

A video-programme introduces the subject. Then come scene and scene showing the history of Prussia from its beginnings as the religious order state and electorate of Brandenburg to the end of the monarchy in 1918 and the dissolution of Prussia in 1947.

The Allied "death certificate" accused Prussia of having always been "a centre of militarism and reaction in Germany."

The catalogue and the whole style of presentation ensure that the visitor, even when admiring monarchic and dynastic pomp, never forgets the social and political context.

The exhibition was the brain-child of former Berlin mayor Dietrich Stobbe (SPD) who writes in the introduction to the catalogue: "Only when we really understand why things happened as we did, when we, as a nation, have studied Prussia and its history, will we win the freedom which Prussia never knew."

This philosophy is also that of the exhibition organisers. The critical, largely socio-political view of Prussia's history has, however, brought vehement objections from other ideological camps.

The main emphasis of the exhibition is on Prussia in the 18th century — the classical period — Prussia's development as an industrial, economic and hegemonial power in the 19th century and finally Prussia during the Weimar Republic.

The visitor learns about the class structure of Prussian society, life at the court, the royal coronation in Königsberg in 1701. He sees the priceless treasures of the royal art and natural history collections and finds out where the limits of tolerance were in Prussian society and why the Prussian enlightenment degenerated into benightment.

Here we see the romantic-Biedermeier joviality of the Prussians and admire the feudal, classical magnificence of court architect Schinkel's Berlin.

Perhaps we can imagine the longing for a democratic constitution which led to the 1848 revolution. The founding of the German Reich is viewed from a critical distance. And Kaiser "by the grace of God" Wilhelm II stares vainly at us from official portraits.

Kaiser Wilhelm I and horse.

An example of the dramatic style of presentation: the class structure of Prussian society is very aptly symbolised by furniture arrangements in the middle of one room: on a dais, a fine, brightly polished table and expensive chairs.

Lower down, the rough and simple tables and chairs of a lower, class family. And on the walls are facsimiles and originals of edicts aimed at perpetuating these class distinctions. The real crops on display underline that Prussia was an agricultural state — in which the Junkers had the say.

The insignia of the Königsberg coronation lit up in a shrine against a brown background. A note of pomp and solemnity, even though we realise that Prussia was not one of the richest kingdoms in the early eighteenth century.

There is not much material in the exhibition on the arts and sciences in the late 17th and early 18th century.

And even the reign of Wilhelm II — especially the natural sciences at this time — is sketchily dealt with. To make up for this, the Enlightenment is given great prominence — in a fine, clearly arranged room.

One of the prize exhibits here is Kant's Critik der Reinen Vernunft. More humble exhibits here include [illegible] spectacles, a coffee grinder and [illegible] section of piping from the [illegible] water supply system laid in 1760.

Frederick the Great's image [illegible] seen here in all shapes and sizes [illegible] does not inspire a shudder of [illegible] submissiveness. Frederick in [illegible] plaster, porcelain, on horseback, [illegible] standing, Frederick in company, Frederick the Philosopher, Frederick [illegible] General, the Patriarch, Frederick as [illegible] ornament for the living room [illegible] and Frederick for schools.

The display of all these [illegible] statuettes unmasks the mythology. [illegible] we certainly do not feel overawed at [illegible] sight of the great man's worn [illegible] or his huge hat with dilapidated [illegible] feathers, his down-at-heels boots or [illegible] gloves.

The indisputable focal point of the exhibition is the court-well of the building, where a reconstruction of the Prussian exhibit at the 1867 Paris exhibition can be seen: a huge, cast-iron statue [illegible] Kaiser Wilhelm I on a horse.

The original is still to be found [illegible] the Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne. Underneath this a tower from which [illegible] visitor can admire the signs of Prussian industrial might — including a replica [illegible] Big Bertha, the huge Krupp-built [illegible] with which Prussian troops [illegible] Paris in the 1870 war.

The Rhineland is taken as an example of how Prussia treated its provinces. [illegible] Cologne silver collection brought to Berlin especially for this exhibition [illegible] lines that Rhineland industrial[illegible] appreciated Prussian dynamism. [illegible] the plate was ordered in a mood of [illegible] thusiasm for the Kaiser and the Reich.

The later *Kulturkampf* and [illegible] proverbial Rhineland humour [illegible] the distance the majority of the Rhine[illegible] landers felt towards Prussia.

The Hänneschen Theater sent [illegible] "Schneuzerkowski" dolls to the exhibition — grotesque caricatures [illegible] Prussian police.

But it should not be [illegible] the Rhinelanders have the [illegible] thank for the completion [illegible] Cathedral.

Werner [illegible]


(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, [illegible])



From left: The Great Elector, Frederick II, and Kaiser Wilhelm I.

■ MEDICINE

Breakthrough in treatment of heart attacks



Use of the enzyme streptokinase has led to a breakthrough in the treatment of heart attacks.

It is a development which has taken even *radiologists and heart specialists* by surprise.

Streptokinase helps dissolve the blood clots in the coronary vessels which cause heart attacks.

The enzyme, prepared from bacteria, affects the coagulation process.

If the blood clot can be dissolved within three hours of the first typical heart infarct symptoms, the damage can be considerably reduced.

Except in the case of rhythm disorders, which kill instantly, the destruction of the heart muscle after the blockage of a vessel is not sudden but comparatively slow.

Tissue cut off from the direct oxygen supply can survive for some time until the infarct occurs.

So if this oxygen-deprived area can be supplied with blood in time, permanent damage is far smaller. In very favourable cases, it means that there is no infarct at all.

It would be justifiable to describe a heart attack as an "imminent infarct." Whether the infarct remains depends solely on the therapy.

The decisive breakthrough in this treatment was made by Professor P. Rentrop at Göttingen University Clinic.

Three years ago he injected streptokinase directly into the blocked vessels of a patient suffering from an acute infarct, using a catheter leading from the upper thigh to the heart.

The therapy was highly effective. Blockages of less than four hours disappeared within 30 minutes.

Blood supply to tissue also improved, as several X-rays of the coronary vessels showed. However, the vessels remain more or less contracted because streptokinase does not prevent the chronic arteriosclerotic deposits which cause blockage.

This means that streptokinase can only restore the status quo before the blockage. But this is enough to save the endangered tissue.

Many cardiologists have found that this treatment does to a large extent preserve the efficiency of the heart muscle.

One indication of this is the rhythm disorders which occur when the affected area is being resuscitated.

These irregularities of heart function were in the past considered a risk. Today they are regarded as a sign that the therapy has been successful.

The movements of the heart wall observable on X-rays and the heart's increased capacity also underline the organ's vitality.

All this goes to show that the method of intra-coronary streptokinase injection developed by Rentrop actually reduces the extent of heart infarcts — provided therapy begins in time.

If therapy comes too late, the blood clots dissolve more slowly and cell-damage is then so great that an infarct cannot be prevented.

Rentrop has now been appointed to a post at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York. He shares the fate of emigration with another pioneer of cardiology, Professor A. Gruntzig, formerly of the Canton of Zurich Clinic, who is now teaching at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.

In 1977, Gruntzig was the first to recanalise blocked coronary vessels using a balloon-catheter, a method he developed in Zurich.

By means of an inflatable balloon at the top of a catheter contractions of vessels caused by arteriosclerotic deposits can be overcome, thus considerably improving the blood supply.

It is now generally recognised that this balloon technique is preferable to heart surgery as long as only one artery is contracted.

Upt to now, the only methods of dealing with these contractions have been heart surgery or by-pass operations.

In by-pass operations, arteriosclerotically contracted or blocked vessels are by-passed by the implantation of healthy sections of vessels. The amazingly simple balloon method, like streptokinase therapy, soon aroused world-wide interest.

According to an American cardiologist, the balloon method — officially know as transluminary angioplastic — is now spreading "like a bush fire."

And the streptokinase method is also making unexpected progress.

These methods have established themselves far more rapidly in the United States than here because heart surgery is far more developed in the United States.

There are far more major heart surgery centres with the catheter laboratories and trained staff needed for both methods.

The astonishing success of the streptokinase method means that infarct therapy is on the threshold of a revolution. There is more and more evidence that streptokinase dissolves thrombi even when injected intravenously.

Professor R. Schröder of Stieglitz Clinic in Berlin has found that the intravenous method is 65 per cent successful. This compares with an 80 to 90 per cent success rate using the intracoronary method. However, the advantage of the intravenous method is that no catheter is needed.

This means that as soon as blood coagulation disorders have been ruled out this method could be applied anywhere and at any time after a heart attack has been diagnosed.

Before this happens, doctors must gain more experience in the intercoronary use of streptokinase.

Up to now, streptokinase and its effects have mainly interested haematologists and the substance and its successful applications have been largely ignored by cardiologists, who were more interested in other methods.

A group of 11 European clinics recently proved that the use of streptokinase immediately after a heart attack can considerably reduce the mortality rate among heart patients.

Developments of the balloon technique and especially of heart surgery will be able to combat clotting and blocking of vessels more effectively.

Upt to now, it has proved very difficult to use the balloon dilatation technique with completely blocked vessels. However, this method would be an ideal form of treatment for vessels partly freed thanks to streptokinase.

All the more so because unblocked vessels tend to collect coagulated b[...] in the following days and to close [...]

Use of balloon dilation can [...] probably reduce the frequency of s[...]quent infarcts.

The streptokinase method and [...] some cases balloon dilation have [...] very beneficial effect on heart s[...] Up to now, infarct patients have [...] undergone by-pass surgery immedi[...] after an infarct because the risk of [...] was too great.

The common practice was to [...] four weeks and then operate – i[...] patient survived that long.

Now that it is possible to [...] blocked vessels, the risk of operating [...] been considerably reduced. This [...] that surgeons are no longer operating [...] dead tissue but on a more or less [...]thy area.

This not only reduces the risks of [...] operation but also improves the effic[...]cy of the recanalised vessels.

Cardiologist Professor G.D. [...] and heart surgeon Professor G. R[...]wald of Hamburg University Clinic [...]cessfully performed operations on [...] patients a few days after by-pass ope[...]tions.

Their example has been followed [...] other heart centres in Göttingen, A[...]hen and West Berlin. In all, 84 patie[...] were operated on in the first ten [...] and another 14 in the first 14 d[...] Most patients were given more than [...] by-pass. This means that not only [...] re-opened arteries but also other [...] sections have been restored.

There were no complications or de[...] in any of these operations. Most [...] the patients are now well. Only [...] have died.


However, it was found that disorde[...] of the by-pass vessels were more f[...]quent with patients operated on earl[...] This is attributed to changes caused [...] the infarct.

New infarcts only occurred with 4 p[...] cent of patients. This means that reca[...]lisation plus surgery is more successf[...] than recanalisation alone, where 20 p[...] cent of patients later have infarcts.

Further experience will have to [...] gathered before we can tell whether [...] lier operations can prolong the life ex[...]pectancy of infarct patients.

Rainer [...]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine [...] für Deutschland, 18 Aug[...])






Ready for anything

The Böblingen fire brigade, near Stuttgart, is the first in the Federal Republic [...] Germany to get a vehicle equipped to deal with radiation accidents and spilled [...] and acid. The DM452,000 vehicle has a variety of equipment from geiger counters [...] lead containers and anti-gas suits. (Photo: [...])

Therapy using a pulsating magnetic current



The German Magnetic Field Therapy Association has been founded to advance magnetic field therapy as a method of healing.

One of the association's main tasks will be to publish research in this new area of physical therapy.

Magnetic field therapy radiation with very low frequency magnetic waves. The method comes originally from the Soviet Union and Rumania, where it is also used in the treatment of psychosomatic illnesses.

In West Germany it is mainly used for serious injuries, slow-healing wounds and fractures and degenerative diseases such as arthritis and neuralgia.

The pulsating magnetic current helps to normalise the cell balance and to accelerate healing, according to its advocates. However, the method is still controversial and not yet recognised by the state insurance schemes.

At the same time, magnetic field machines are used in about 70 hospitals in this country, including a number of university clinics.

The association's members are doctors and members of the magnetic technology industry. The association's president is Prof. Dr. Dieter Böhmer, director of the Land Hesse Sports Medicine Advisory Centre.

dpa

(Kieler Nachrichten, 4 August 1981)

SOCIETY

Old-age pensioners go back to university – and do well

[A]bout 60 old age pensioners from the Ruhr area have registered for a [...]term course on The Problems of [the] Aged at Dortmund University. The [...] provides a qualification in social [...], education and counselling for the [...]

[R]udolf E., a dynamic, committed pen[sion]er, explains why he decided to take [the] course:

"Three months of retirement were [en]ough. I felt superfluous and missed [con]tact with other people. I was active [in] the trade union all my working life [an]d I wanted to be involved in social [wor]k now that I am retired. The course [pro]vides the basic knowledge I need to [do] social work for the aged. You have to [be] well informed when you are dealing [w]ith officials and public institutions."

The course, run by the Education De[par]tment of Dortmund University, is the [o]nly one of its kind in the country.

Since 1974, the department has had [a]n Academy for the Aged. On the as[s]umption that even in old age people [a]re still capable of learning, the universi[t]y was opened to senior citizens. They [a]re allowed to attend all lectures as [g]uests. Old people's main interest is in gerontology and social work for the aged.

The very active "mature students" soon found that this was not enough. They said that leisure activities were all well and good but serious work would be better. They wanted to use their newly acquired knowledge for some practical and useful purpose. So they asked to be allowed to take a regular course with a recognised degree at the end of it.

Dortmund University agreed and developed its course in conjunction with the North Rhine Westphalian Ministry of Education. The project is financed by the *Land* North Rhine-Westphalia.

The course began in April 1980. 42 mature students — half of them men, half women aged between 44 and 69 — have so far taken part in the courses, according to project leader Dr Ludger Veelken, a sociologist.

In two terms, students will be awarded a certificate of successful completion of the course.

Most students chose one or more of the following subjects in their courses: sociology, education, psychology and philosophy.

None of them complain that they find learning difficult or have had any difficulty grasping anything.

On the contrary, they have surprised themselves by their quickness. Indeed, their performances are sometimes even better than those of the regular young students they work with.

This can be explained by their high degree of motivation and interest in what they are studying. And by the fact that for some of the participants this course represents the fulfilment of a life-long dream to study at university.

Asked whether these old students represent a new reservoir of university-educated talent, Dr. Veelken says: "We should talk of a reservoir of life. We do not just want to educate, we want to encourage these people to help themselves and perhaps to find reserves of interest and ability that were hidden in their professional and family lives."

Given this intention, it is quite logical that the university does not insist on formal academic qualifications for admission to the course. It rightly assumes that students have acquired the qualification for an academic course of study in their life and professional experience.

Potential students have preliminary discussions with lecturers, who merely advise them on whether or not to take the course.

Would-be students also have the option of spending two years in the Academy for the Aged as guest listeners at lectures and then going on to the course proper.

The Study Commission of Dortmund University wracked their brains in an effort to find a name for the qualification and came up with the ponderous, not to say ridiculously high-falutin' and incomprehensible designations of "animators" and "multiplicators."

"Animators" study the methodology of group work, pottery, music, batik and sport. Once they are qualified these people can then pass on their knowledge to their peers as course or group directors.

In the "multiplicators" course, participants specialise in sociology, psychology and social education, especially in connection with gerontology. When they have completed their courses, they are fully-fledged "experts on the problems of the aged."

Qualified to work as counsellors

This qualifies them to work as advisors and counsellors in institutions for the aged, associations and companies, churches and other bodies concerned with age and the problems of coping in old age.

The course also qualifies them to represent the interests of senior citizens in Old People's Advisory Councils — for instance in trade unions, associations and, above all, on local councils.

Doris Gothe

(General-Anzeiger, 15 August 1981)

■ STATE SECURITY

Annual report highlights fundamental mistrust from the left

Bonn Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum (FDP) does not enjoy presenting the annual Office for the Protection of the Constitution report.

The Opposition have in the past accused him of playing down the dangers of left-wing terrorism.

And the Left are hostile to the very idea of such a report because they dislike the very existence of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.


SPD home politics expert Hugo Brandt told Baum a few days ago what he thought of the 159-page report. He said: "If there is a danger to our democracy, it probably does not come from the organisations and little groups mentioned in the report."

One may agree with Hugo Brandt that red and brown flags do not constitute the only danger to our constitution.

On the other hand, sceptics ought to reply to the question why they are so uninterested in the report's data. After all, the report contains information on many groups who are supremely indifferent to the paragraphs of the Basic Law because they do not like the constitution as a whole.

Among other things, the report contains information on:

- various constantly changing groups on the extreme right, from the Hoffmann Military Sport Group to the German People's Union. Their membership totals 19,800 (plus 2,500). These groups



show an increasing tendency to use violence.

- over 63,700 card-carrying left-wing extremists along with 43,200 members of left-extremist dominated organisations;
- over 133 extremist foreigners' organisations in this country with over 100,000 members. These groups also show an increasing readiness to use violence.

The figures themselves are not the alarming aspect of the report. There has been no dramatic increase on the previous year. And extremists' electoral impact is minimal.

In the October 1980 general election the DKP (German Communist Party) and the NPD (National Democratic Party) each reached an all-time low.

What is alarming is the extremists' increasing readiness to use violence to compensate for the inadequate appeal of their arguments. The trend towards crime is something right and left-wing extremists and extremist foreigners have in common.

The increase in militancy was by right-wing extremists was particularly evident last year. This time, Herr Baum did not need to apologise for starting his report with a survey of right-wing terrorism.

Seventeen people were killed by right-wing terrorists last year, 13 of these at the Munich *Oktoberfest* bomb attack.

Former Military Sport Group member Gundolf Köhler is strongly suspected of this. The State Prosecutor suspects the so-called "Deutsche Aktionsgruppen" of being responsible for the murder of two Vietnamese refugees in Hamburg.

Two Swiss border officials were shot dead by the neo-Nazi Schubert. The days of law-abiding right-wing extremism in West Germany are over.

Brown terror is on the march.

A striking feature of extreme left-wing politics in 1980 was the trend towards some strange alliances. The orthodox DKP — which according to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution receives at least DM50m annually from East Berlin — disregarded the fine points of dogma and showed considerable tactical flexibility in alliance with the hated New Left — and not only with them.

The report says that left-wing extremists also carried out joint action with Democrats, particularly in protest against the Nato modernisation decision. This should make Social Democrats examine their own consciences. . .

The wealth of material in the report does not, of course, satisfy everyone.

Carl-Dietrich Spranger, CDU/CSU [...] policy expert, whom the SPD/FDP [...] sider an advocate of a police state, [...] scribed the report as "inadequate."

He was probably referring to [...] information on the activities of ext[...] ists in the public service. Since the [...] of 1978 the Bonn government and [...] *Länder* have dropped the practice of [...] tomatically asking the Office for [...] Protection of the Constitution to [...] applicants for the public service. The [...] to this practice we can assume [...] there are in fact more than 2,300 [...] wing and 362 right-wing extremists [...] the public service.

This does not of course reduce [...] value of the report. However, experts [...] increasingly sceptical about the com[...] tence of the OPC's officials.

'Evidence of a lost Innocence'

This decline has been ascribed to [...] vernment politicians and sections of the [...] media — who regard the very existence [...] of the OPC as evidence of this country's [...] lost innocence.

Hans Josef Horchem, former head of [...] the Hamburg Office for the Protection [...] of the Constitution, protested against [...] this development in July.

He says that the OPC faces disinte[...] gration because SPD/FDP politicians [...] disliked it.

His suggested cure is unlikely to [...] much support. He advocates privately [...] run intelligence services.

Lothar M. Marschel

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und W[...], 14 August 19[...])

Neo-Nazis just small part of right-wing terror spectrum

Neo-Nazis are just a small part in the spectrum of right-wing extremism in West Germany.

According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution report, there were 800 organised neo-Nazi activists, 400 financial backers and 600 neo-Nazis working in isolation.

And there were 18,000 right-wing extremists in other organisations, from the NPD to "free nationalist" groups.

However, the violent right recruits most of its members from neo-Nazi circles. The most important group here is the Hoffmann Military Sport Group. Its leader Karl-Heinz Hoffmann is now under arrest facing charges of terrorism.

The OPC report presents figures to back this up. The number of extreme right-wing crimes rose by ten per cent in 1980 to 1,643. Of these, 77 per cent were committed by neo-Nazis. The 1,643 crimes include 113 acts of violence such as murder, bomb and fire attacks. 76 per cent of these were probably by neo-Nazis.

The most serious of these crimes, the bomb attack at last year's Munich Oktoberfest in which 13 people were killed, is believed to have been committed by a former member of the Hoffmann Military Sport Group who was himself killed in the explosion.

Another neo-Nazi killed two Swiss border officials and then committed suicide on Christmas Day, 1980.

He was probably involved in arms smuggling.

The report shows that one characteristic of these neo-Nazi groups is that except for the military sport groups they do not have any organisational structure but tend to work together in small groups of members and financial backers. The report shows the interconnections between neo-Nazis.

A search of the house of former lawyer Röder showed how active the neo-Nazis financial backers are.

From summer 1979 to summer 1980, DM84,000 was paid into Röder's "German Citizens' Initiative" account. Donors included a significantly high proportion of old age pensioners — 45 per cent of all backers. And 12 per cent of donors were from abroad. For right wing publishers and publications, the trend, however, is downwards. The average weekly circulation of these publications dropped from 174,300 in 1979 to 159,700 in 1980. The number of publishers and sales outlets rose at the same time from 45 to 65 — because, as the report says, "there is still a big demand for literature on and in justification of the Nazis."



Karl-Heinz Hoffmann . . . facing charges. (Photo: Sven Simon)

The *Deutsche National Zeitung* continues to have the highest circulation.

Its publisher Dr. Frey represents the "national-liberal right". The paper has a print-run of 100,000 and "seems to be on a sound financial footing."

Largely unnoticed by the general public, the German People's Union led by Frey has become the largest extreme right-wing organisation ahead of the National Democratic Party. Frey achieved this by changing his party statutes to include all the members of his People's movement for a General Amnesty and his "Initiative for a Limit on Foreign Workers".

Hostility towards foreigners was a major factor in the recruitment of right-wing extremists. 119 crimes, including the bomb attack on a Hamburg hostel in which two Vietnamese were killed, were clearly inspired by hostility to foreigners.

Slogans such as "dagos out" and "don't buy from Turks" are grimly reminiscent of anti-Jewish slogans.

It was the potential appeal of the anti-foreigner campaign that persuaded the NDP not to disband or change its leadership.

Whether this will be enough to halt the party's slide remains to be seen. But the party leadership's authority continues to dwindle.

After losing another 800 members the party now totals only 7,200 according to the report, which adds: "The party's organisation is so desolate that it is impossible to give precise figures."

The report says that the NPD is unable to pay the Bundestag administration the DM768,000 election costs which it owes.


"It is hoping for postponement, writing off of the debt or repayment in instalments." On the other hand, the NPD continues to publish the *Deutsche Stimme*, which has a circulation of 100,000.

Volker Jacobi

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 12 August 1981)

[...]ORT

Blind athletes show a clean pair of heels



[...] Kahova was in a hurry. She [...] hardly received her medal for [...] metres sprint, which she won in [...] record of 8.89 seconds, than she [...] rush off to take part in the long [...]

[...]d in the sprint was Tamara Pan[...] who had previously shared Kaho[...] world record of 9 seconds.

[...]-placed Santamarta Purificacion [...]iously over the moon. Dutch[...] Joke van Rijswijk wept bitterly. [...] helplessness or just the release of [...] tension after the race?

[...] Rijswijk, like the other competi[...] the sprint, is blind. She was one [...] competitors in the second Euro[...] Sports for the Blind Competition [...]da, Hesse.

[...] blind run in the dark, jump in [...]k, and play in the dark. They say [...] sport brings light into their dark[...] and boosts their self-confidence.

[...] of the competitors said that [...] on the competitive aspect of sport [...] the handicapped is a perversion of [...] original idea of encouraging the [...]capped to enjoy sport for its own [...]

[...]he Soviet team, for example, went [...] a training camp before these games [...]ained on the Sunday morning at 7 [...] breakfast. Is this really the right [...]

[...]bert Antlitz, a partly-sighted long [...]er from Marburg, says: "We are [...]lly healthy organically. What is [...] difference between us and the non-[...]capped?"

He says that the 600 athletes from 23 countries who competed are "the tip of the iceberg."

Handicapped people have to rely on others, particularly the blind. In sprints for example the runners are guided by sounds. A partner stands at the 50-metre mark and tells them what direction to run in. And nearer the tape another assistant repeats the process, shouting instructions to the runners.

Englishman Graham Salomon won the 100 metres in 12.4 seconds. He trains with miniature radio in his ear which keeps him on the right track. Less well trained blind athletes risk running off the track and injuring themselves.

The athletes' relief on reaching the tape is evident. The satisfaction of having achieved something.

Partnership is an extremely important factor here. In the men's sprint Israeli Jakobowitz had two false starts and was disqualified. An official said that that was what it said in the regulations and that was that.

Maybe this disqualification conformed to the rules but certainly not to the spirit of the occasion.

And the mayor of Fulda's present to the President of the International Blind Sport Association did not betray hypersensitivity — an etching of the city of Fulda. A bit more *fingerspitzengefühl* in the literal sense of the word was called for here.

Apart from this gaffe, the city of Fulda put a lot of effort into the competition and the local newspaper deserves praise for its extensive coverage. Despite this, the blind at Fulda remained isolated. It was a similar situation at the World Deaf Games in Cologne.

Games such as those in Fulda are an ideal way of making people aware of the problems of the handicapped.

And if only a fraction of this awareness were carried over into ordinary everyday life, then these games will have served a purpose, for the blind and for the sighted.

Fine speeches do not in the long run create partnership. The blind take sport for granted.

And contacts between the blind and the sighted should be just as much taken for granted.

It is the sighted who have all the work to do here. The blind have shown the way.

Richard Becker

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 August 1981)



Record effort

Sabina Everts long-jumping to 6.66 metres on the way to setting a German record of 6,357 points in the heptathlon, a new discipline of seven events, at Lage. (Photo: Bongarts)

Another ice hockey scandal

German ice hockey, still reeling from last season's scandals, is still in the wars. It is almost certain that the transfer cards of six Czech players who fled to West Germany have been forged.

This latest revelation follows the passport forgeries affair of last season which has still not been cleared up.

The purpose of the exercise in both cases is to qualify players to take part in *Bundesliga* games.

This time, too, money passed hands. The details that have so far come to light are astonishing. There are indications, for instance, that a fictional club was invented.

The story begins on 4 January this year when Krefeld EV lost 3–5 to ECD Iserlohn in a second division game.

Next day, Krefeld chairman Paul Hotstegs received a mysterious phone call from a Czech agent, who said that Czech refugee Kratschmar of Iserlohn was not qualified to play because he did not have a transfer card.

Foreigners are only entitled to play immediately in the *Bundesliga* if they have a transfer card from their home hockey association. Otherwise they have to wait 18 months.

ECD Iserlohn officials, fearful of the German Ice Hockey Association's sport courts, remember the incident exactly. Ingo Graumann, ECD lawyer, says: "We had a contract with Kratschmar, but we did not select him for the team because he had no transfer card."

Of course they could have acquired a transfer card of sorts — from the same player's agent who later blew the gaffe on the whole operation.

It would have cost DM20,000.

Graumann continues: "We played Kratschmar once, in a game against Krefeld, because we had received a transfer card from a team called SC Selm from a lower league in the Hanover area."

The Ice Hockey Association smelt a rat and pursued the matter further. According to vice-president Günter Sabetzki of Düsseldorf the association is still looking for this club and the men behind it.

The player's agent from Czechoslovakia says he knows nothing about the non-existent club or about bogus transfer cards. "All the cards are authentic. This will be proved."

Günter Sabetzki is more than sceptical about this claim. It was he who detected the skulduggery.

"When I compared signatures, I saw that the one on the card was not that of Herr Subrt of the Czech Hockey Association in Prague.

Herr Subrt told me that he had not signed a transfer card in the past year. And the Czech association's stamp is completely different from the one on the card."

Düsseldorf EG were amazed when their players Mucha and Chipaz suddenly produced transfer cards. They immediately informed the GIHA. Duisburg SC were cautioned in connection with their Czech player Nowak.

Whatever investigations here; in Czechoslovakia and in Vienna, where the International Ice Hockey Association has its headquarters; reveal, one thing is already clear: the GIHA and its officials will have their hands full in the coming months getting to the bottom of it.

Hans-Rüdiger Bein/dpa

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 14 August 1981)

I say, chukka, chaps! (if you can afford it)

[...]o was made an Olympic discipline [...]early 50 years ago, but the last [...] the sport featured in the games [...]n 1936 in Berlin.

[...] chances of polo being restored in [...] Olympic programme do not look [...]

[...]re is no place for it in the provi[...] programme for 1984 in Los An[...]

[...]re is no doubt that polo has an [...] of exclusiveness. The four players [...] polo team are each given handicaps [...] the team's handicap is the result of [...]g each player's score.

[...]andicaps are revised each year on [...] basis of performances. The higher [...] handicap which ranges from +10 to -2, [...] stronger the team.

[...]he sorry state of German polo is [...]lined by the fact that there are [...] 104 officially handicapped players [...] the country in 10 clubs. There only [...] club, Munich Polo Club, in Bavaria.

[...]his month the German polo elite [...] part in an international tournament [...] the superb polo pitch — about three [...]es as big as a football pitch — at [...]nn, near Holzkirchen.

[...]he tournament has been arranged [...]nks largely to the efforts od Munich [...]o Club president Ernst Freiherr von [...]in.

[...]he competitors will include the [...]am of German polo from Berlin, [...]sseldorf, Hamburg, Berlin and Mu[...]ch, plus teams from England and Ar[...]ntina, the home of the sport. The

German entrants will compete in the medium goal category.

Riding, golf and tennis are becoming increasingly popular in Germany and have lost something of their aura of exclusiveness.

This democratisation of sport has not yet reached polo, which is one of the oldest of all sports. It was played in the seventh century B.C. in Persia.

There are several reasons why keen young riders and sportsmen are not keen on polo.

Players must have their own horses. Von Stain says that polo horses are cheaper, being a cross between English thoroughbreds and Argentinian pampa horses.

To gain experience, players have to take part in at least two tournaments a season and each player has to bring two robust horses with him. This means travel and transport costs, plus the costs of keeping a horse about DM450 a month.)

Other costs: player's kit: DM1,000; horse equipment: DM1,000; plus a share of the cost of upkeep of training and playing fields, stables and other club costs.

Travel costs to the training grounds cannot be disregarded in view of the huge increase in petrol prices.

All this is a high price to pay in a sport which makes high demands on players, requiring great skill, manoeuvrability and horsemanship. At the highest levels, the horses sometimes move at 60kms per hour. This is when polo can be an enthralling spectator sport.

It must be assumed that financial reasons explain the small number of players. Most polo players have well-paid posts in industry or at universities or else they own large estates and have plenty of funds.

Von Stain says: "Of course we are interested in bringing on and even giving financial support to young people interested in polo."

Hardly surprising when you consider that of the 80 members of the club only 10 are active.

Günther Erhardt

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 August 1981)